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Introducing capital market imperfections to a ￿ footloose capital￿model,
I show how such distortions may explain the observed phenomena of an in-
dustrialized north and an underdeveloped south. Further, I show that with
inter-generational savings internationalization will cause a crowding out of
manufacturing ￿rms in the south, increasing the share of the southern pop-
ulation that are credit-constrained, and also reducing total income in the
country. This should not, however, be taken as an argument for protection-
ism, as welfare may indeed be higher with trade than in autarky, if trade
costs are su¢ ciently low.
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211 Introduction
Globalization is much more than just the increased movement of goods between
countries. Although the economic literature has traditionally had a much stronger
focus on trying to explain international trade in goods, there has over the last
decades grown a more vivid debate around the phenomenon of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), and rightly so. Until it dropped as a consequence of the interna-
tional ￿nancial crisis in 2007, FDI had signi￿cantly outgrown international trade
in goods over the last decades (UNCTAD, 2008). This aspect of globalization has
been studied on many di⁄erent levels, from balance of payments and capital ac-
count issues, to micro-level labor market determinants and e⁄ects. Another very
interesting question in this literature is the interplay between international trade
and foreign direct investments. Although often ignored, this interaction is not new
to the literature. Mundell￿ s (1957) modi￿cation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model pre-
dicted that factor ￿ ows were substitutes for trade in goods. In this model world,
it is relative di⁄erences in factor endowments that drive incentives for both trade
in goods and for factor ￿ ows, and Mundell showed that impediments to trade
would increase factor movements, and vice versa. Trade and factor mobility were
substitutes in the sense that the more mobile of the two would always work to-
wards equalizing the factor prices. However, real-world observations have shown
that relatively little capital moves from capital-rich countries to capital-poor coun-
tries, and if the model were true, Prebisch￿ s (1950) observation of industrialized
￿ core-countries￿selling their manufactured goods in exchange for primary goods
from the underdeveloped ￿ periphery￿would not be the result. Recently Antr￿s
and Caballero (2009) reapproached this question. Introducing ￿nancial frictions
into a Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model of trade, they ￿nd that "in less developed
economies (South), trade and capital mobility are compliments in the sense that
trade integration increases [...] the incentives for capital to ￿ ow to South." I argue
that the Heckscher-Ohlin framework is not very well suited for discussing such
e⁄ects of trade integration on factor movements. The reason for this is that in
these models one generally observes only one-way trade ￿ ows in each sector, which
means that a trade liberalization in one sector is in fact a unilateral lowering of
trade costs, which may lead to di⁄erent conclusions than when trade integration
22happens through a bilateral lowering of trade costs. When trade liberalization is
de facto an increased market access for ￿rms in one country without a reciprocal
compensation, these ￿rms will gain an advantage, and locating in this country will
be more attractive than before the trade liberalization. For competing ￿rms in
the other country, the e⁄ect will be exactly the opposite, and ￿rms will thus have
incentives to relocate to the country that has gained increased market access to the
other country. Another reason I ￿nd this kind of unilateral trade integration less
interesting is the fact that trade integration over the last century has been domi-
nated by multilateral liberalization through GATT and the WTO, and regionalism
(NAFTA, EU and others), while unilateral trade liberalization has mainly been
associated with developing countries opening up their economies for trade and
investment "due to the demise of the socialist model" (Janeba and Schjelderup,
2003).
One of the ￿ stylized facts￿about the globalized world is that there exist core-
and periphery-countries, where the former mainly produce and export manufac-
tured goods, while the latter specialize in commodities. Further, it has been well
documented that while this specialization determines the relative net trade ￿ ows
in each industry, there is also a signi￿cant amount of intra-industry trade, where
di⁄erent varieties of the same type of product are being traded in both directions.
The ￿ new economic geography￿(NEG) literature has lately shown mechanisms
that may explain both of these ￿ facts.￿ Inter-regional models where labor is as-
sumed to be mobile between regions has shown how a small di⁄erence in market
sizes may start a process of concentration that "feeds on itself" through attracting
more ￿rms, which attract more workers, which again increases the di⁄erences in
market sizes etc. until all production takes place at the same point in space (see
for example Krugman, 1991). International trade models rarely assume labor to
be mobile, but may still generate similar results. Krugman and Venables (1995)
show how linkages between intermediate and ￿nal goods production can generate
a circular process that leads to a core and a periphery in a similar way. In their
model the periphery may gain or lose from globalization depending on the level of
trade costs.
In this paper I combine and extend the aforementioned literature by building
a model with both international trade and capital movements, as well as introduc-
23ing another important factor to determine the degree of industrialization: credit
constraints. Borrowing constraints have been argued to limit investments in both
human and physical capital, and thus work as a major hindrance to economic
growth in high-income countries, but more so in low-income countries. In Krug-
man and Venables (1995) the two countries are initially identical, except that "one
region for some reason has a larger manufacturing sector." I argue that credit con-
straints may be one reason relative sector sizes may di⁄er between two countries
that are otherwise identical. In this paper I develop a theoretical model that shows
how credit constraints may determine the initial degree of industrialization in a
country, but also how they may interact with the e⁄ects of globalization. Espe-
cially I focus on how credit market imperfections in a developing country may lead
to a deindustrialization of the country when it becomes more integrated in the
global economy. My model also predicts that a trade integration will lead to a
concentration of industry in the country with the more developed ￿nancial mar-
kets. However, this may lead to an increase or a decrease in international trade,
depending on the initial situation. As such, trade and capital ￿ ows may both be
complements or substitutes.
My basic ￿ workhorse￿model replicates results from the NEG literature where
su¢ ciently free trade will cause agglomeration of manufacturing production in one
country.1 In this simple north-south model the country with the better functioning
￿nancial markets will start out as more industrialized, and through this generate
higher total income, making it a more attractive market, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, the more developed north will have more than its proportional share of
￿rms, thus making competition harder than in the less developed south. For high
levels of trade costs, this competition e⁄ect will dominate the market size e⁄ect,
￿rms￿pro￿ts will be larger in the less developed country, and ￿rms will have incen-
tives to move south. As trade costs fall ￿rms start to experience competition from
abroad, and the market size e⁄ect will gradually become more important, relative
to the competition e⁄ect. For su¢ ciently free trade ￿rms will prefer to locate in
the more developed country, and there will be capital movements from the south
1In addition to the above cited papers by Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995),
see for example Ciccone and Hall (1996), Duranton and Overman (2005) and Baldwin and
Okubo (2006) for theoretical and empirical contributions. For a comprehensive review of the
agglomeration literature, see Puga (2010).
24to the north. There also exists a level of trade costs, below which all ￿rms in the
model will locate in the developed country, and the developing country will be
completely deindustrialized. In this basic version of the model the real wages in
the south will always be higher in the international equilibrium than in autarky
for all levels of trade costs, and thus also for trade costs that lead to complete
deindustrialization in the south. However, this result depends crucially on the as-
sumption that the number of ￿rms is determined by the initial wealth distribution
and is constant after that. Introducing intergenerational wealth dynamics into the
model, I show that credit constraints and international competition will lead to
a drop in the number of southern-owned ￿rms. Tougher competition will cause
a consolidation with fewer but larger ￿rms, and this will happen through stricter
credit constraints in the south, leading to a deindustrialization there. If trade is
su¢ ciently costly, this may lead to a drop in real wages when going from autarky
to a globalized equilibrium with trade and capital movements.
1.1 Previous literature
This paper draws on two strands of economic literature. On one hand it extends
the work of Banerjee and Newman (1993), Ranjan (2001), Das (2006), Chesnokova
(2007), and others who study how credit constraints determine sector sizes and in-
dustry structure, and how these again may be a⁄ected by international trade. The
￿rst one of these does not focus on trade at all, whereas the other three all assume
two, homogeneous, internationally traded goods. This rules out intra-industry
trade by assumption, which I will show can have important implications on policy
implications derived from such trade models. None of the models consider capital
mobility between countries. My model shows how international trade and inter-
national capital movements interact, and also how both of them may, individually
and in combination, a⁄ect the degree of credit constraints in a country.
The other strand of relevant literature that I follow is the new trade theory, and
new economic geography literature discussed above. More speci￿cally my model
is a variation on Dupont and Martin (2006), which again builds on the ￿ Footloose
Capital￿models by Martin and Rogers (1995) and Krugman (1991). These models
describe the interplay between international trade and capital movements when
25￿rms are mobile. Industry sizes are determined either exogenously by capital
endowments or endogenously through some zero-pro￿t condition. In this paper I
introduce wealth inequalities in the populations, and capital market imperfections
that determine the degree of industrialization in each country. I also show how,
when capital market imperfections are present, long-term e⁄ects from globalization
may change some of the ￿ndings from the static version of the model.
2 The model
In this section I develop a two-country model of international trade, with mobile
capital, immobile agents, and imperfect credit markets. First I discuss a static ver-
sion of the model, which could be interpreted as a short-term view of the world. In
this version credit constraints determine the number of ￿rms in each country, which
again determine trade and capital ￿ ows. Later I introduce some wealth dynamics
over generations, and look at the long-term e⁄ects when the wealth distribution
in the population is determined by intergenerational saving. This opens up the
possibility that international market outcomes feed back into the credit constraints
in both countries, thus a⁄ecting the total number of ￿rms in the long-term equi-
librium. In the static model lower trade costs will lead to a concentration of the
manufacturing industry in the developed north. The number of ￿rms is constant
and agents are immobile, however, and southern-owned ￿rms will repatriate their
pro￿ts to their owners in the south. Welfare in the south is a⁄ected negatively by
having to cover trade costs on goods that used to be produced in the south, but
are now produced in the north. On the other hand, all goods that are imported
from the northwill now have lower trade costs. In sum the latter e⁄ect will dom-
inate the former in this version of the model, and welfare in the south is higher
in the globalized equilibrium than in autarky for all levels of trade costs. In the
long-term version of the model globalization may lead to a drop in the number of
southern-owned ￿rms, and under this formulation globalization may cause immis-
erizing deindustrialization in the south with a drop in both real wages and overall
social welfare. Welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization are thus similar to those in
the work of Brander and Krugman (1983), where an initial trade integration from
full autarky may reduce welfare as long as wasteful transportation costs dominate
26the gains from increased variety. Further liberalization will, however, reduce the
loss from transport costs, and for su¢ ciently free trade welfare will again be higher
than in autarky.
2.1 Basic setup
There are two countries, north and south, where south is denoted by an asterisk.
Each country has a population of measure one, L = L￿ = 1, and each individual
in the population is endowed with some initial wealth Wi, distributed according to
some cumulative distribution function G(W), and one unit of labor which he or
she supplies inelastically in the market. Income is spent to maximize the following
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Here CA is consumption of a traditional good, CM is a consumption-bundle of
manufactured varieties, and ￿ is the constant elasticity of substitution between
varieties. I assume the common feature of costless di⁄erentiation, so that each
￿rm in the manufacturing sector produces a unique variety, and n+n￿ = nW thus
denotes both the total number of ￿rms in the world and the number of varieties
produced.
The consumers￿budget is determined by their initial wealth and their earnings.
Each individual may choose between three occupations; being a worker in the
traditional sector, being a worker in the manufacturing sector, or becoming an
entrepreneur and starting up their own business. Labor is homogeneous, and
workers can move freely between the sectors, meaning that any surplus labor supply
from the manufacturing sector will work producing the traditional good, and wages
will be ￿xed at the level determined by prices and productivity in this sector.
Each agent then chooses the occupation that maximizes income, given his credit
constraint.
Becoming an entrepreneur implies undertaking an initial investment I mea-
sured in units of labor, and supplying the unit of labor in administration. The
latter implies that each individual may start at most one ￿rm. For this setup to
27be interesting, income from being a ￿rm-owner must be higher than regular wages,
which I assume to be the case: ￿ ￿ I > w. Imperfections in the credit market,
however, mean that not all agents can become entrepreneurs. I follow the stan-
dard approach in the literature, and assume that individuals can only borrow some
multiple ￿ > 1 of their initial wealth. This multiplier is a function of a number of
factors in the country, such as the contractual climate, borrowers￿ability to use
assets as collateral for loans, rule of law, political risks, etc., and it can be used as
an aggregate indicator of the sophistication of the ￿nancial system in the country.
Assuming that the north is the more developed country, I thus assume that ￿ > ￿
￿,
meaning that individuals in the north are able to borrow a larger multiple of their
own wealth. In order to become an entrepreneur, an individual must have enough
initial wealth and access to loans to be able to undertake the initial investment,
￿W ￿ wI;






This shows that the minimum initial wealth required to become an entrepreneur
in the north will be lower than in the south, and since initial wealth is identically
distributed in the two countries, there will be more unconstrained agents in the
north. Agents are immobile between countries, and a potential entrepreneur is
subject to the ￿nancial environment in his home country. As long as pro￿ts from
being an entrepreneur are still higher than normal wages in both countries, there
will be more entrepreneurs in the north than in the south; n > n￿. In other words,
even though both countries are endowed with equal amounts of ￿nancial capital,
the allocation is more e¢ cient in the north, and the north will be more physical
capital-rich than the south. I will thus classify the north as the capital-rich country
for the rest of this paper.
Both countries can produce both the traditional and the manufacturing good.
I assume that the parameter values are such that the traditional product is pro-
duced in both countries in equilibrium. This sector exhibits a constant returns
to scale technology, using only labor as input, and is traded costlessly across the
28borders under perfect competition. This somewhat unrealistic but very convenient
assumption ensures that the price of this good is equal in both markets, and with
identical technologies, also causes wages to be equal in both countries. I make the
common assumption in the literature that units and productivity in the traditional
sector are such that wages are equal to the price of the traditional good, and use
this as the numeraire, hence w = PA = 1 = P ￿
A = w￿.
The manufactured goods sector exhibits traditional Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition. Varieties of the manufactured good is produced with increasing re-
turns to scale, requiring an initial investment wI to set up a headquarters, which
must be located in the home country, and a production unit which may be located
in either country. The production process uses only labor as input. Speci￿cally
the total costs for a ￿rm in the manufacturing sector is w(I + xi), where xi is
produced quantity by ￿rm i.
I will ￿rst present a static version of the model where the initial wealth distrib-
ution determines the number of ￿rms in each country. This version resembles most
closely other economic geography models, and illustrates some central mechanisms
in an intuitive way. Later I introduce dynamics into the model, and show how this
changes some important results from the static version of the model.
2.2 Autarky
The utility function permits the use of two-stage budgeting. The ￿rst stage deter-








where Y is total expendable income, PA is the price of the traditional good, and
PM is the price index for the manufactured goods.





















With the traditional constant elasticity of substitution assumptions of Dixit-Stiglitz,
all varieties are equally good substitutes for each other, and the consumers express
love-of-variety preferences. In equilibrium, the aggregate demand for a given vari-









Demand for a given variety is thus always decreasing in its own price, and increas-
ing in the prices of competing varieties. As is also normal in this kind of model,
pro￿t maximizing generates ￿rst-order conditions which imply that the equilibrium




w > w: (2)
Rearranging these ￿rst-order conditions, yields




where the left-hand side obviously denotes operating pro￿ts. This means that we
can express operating pro￿ts as some constant fraction 1
￿ of total revenue.2 All
￿rms are identical and produce with the same costs, and prices are therefore the





i di = np1￿￿. Using the result that w = 1, operating pro￿ts






This shows, quite intuitively, that consumers￿preferences for the manufactured
good ￿, and the total budget in the country Y in sum de￿nes the size of the
national market, and a larger market means larger pro￿ts for ￿rms. Pro￿ts are
2I assume that the second-order conditions for utility maximization are ful￿lled for all values
of nW. This implies that a limitation for my parameters is that ￿ ￿ ￿￿1
￿ .
30naturally falling in the number of ￿rms n, which simply expresses how many
￿rms will have to share the market. The elasticity of substitution ￿ captures the
competition aspect of this model. A higher value of ￿ means that consumers are
better able to substitute one variety for another, and this limits the ￿rms￿ability
to set the price above the marginal costs. More similar varieties will thus decrease
￿rms￿market power in their variety￿ s segment, and will reduce pro￿ts.
The national income is determined by
Y =
Z
WdG(W) + (1 ￿ n) + n(￿ ￿ I): (4)
This is simply the sum of all the individuals￿initial wealth, plus the share of
the population who are workers, and earning normal wages, plus the share of the
population who are entrepreneurs, earning ￿ ￿ I. Equations (3) and (4) de￿ne
a unique equilibrium, and simultaneously determine ￿rms￿operating pro￿ts and
expendable income as functions of the number of ￿rms. This solution can also be
























This is increasing in the number of ￿rms, implying that the country as a whole
will bene￿t from improvements in the ￿nancial system that increase the degree
of industrialization, which seems realistic given most indices of quality of life and
degree of industrialization.
Behind these results lies the fact that ￿rm owners may lose from competition
from new ￿rms, whereas the constrained agents in the economy always gain from an
increased number of ￿rms, thus creating an insider-outsider problem, where once
on the inside, ￿rm owners do not want anyone else to be able to start up a business,
even though it would be for the bene￿t of the society as a whole. This could explain
situations in countries where a privileged few may work against reforms that would
31improve local credit markets in order to maintain their favorable position. Such
issues are, however, beside the scope of this paper and will not be addressed.
2.3 Static model in a globalized world
With no ￿xed costs in exporting and costless di⁄erentiation, all ￿rms sell in both
markets. CES demand functions and standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic compe-
tition imply that mill-pricing is optimal. This means that a ￿rm producing in the
north and selling its product in the north at a price p, will sell its product in the
south at a price p￿ = ￿p, where ￿ ￿ 1 denotes the tradition iceberg trading costs.
























i di can be seen as the degree of competition in the northern market.
Since prices are constant mark-ups over marginal costs and marginal costs are















Following common practice in the literature, I let ￿ = ￿1￿￿ denote the freeness of
trade. With ￿ > 1 =) 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, meaning that ￿ = 1 denotes completely costless
trade, and ￿ = 0 implies in￿nite trade costs.




























￿ n(1 + I) + n￿: (7)







￿ (1 + I) + n
￿￿
￿: (8)
Equations (5)-(8) form a system of equations that can be solved to express the
equilibrium in the model in terms of n and n￿; the number of northern- and
southern-owned ￿rms, respectively.
When capital is mobile, unconstrained individuals may choose to produce in
either country. With costless reallocation ￿rms will naturally ￿ ow towards the
market where pro￿ts are higher, until pro￿ts are equal in both markets or all ￿rms
are concentrated in one market. The di⁄erence between pro￿ts for ￿rms operating












The sign of this expression is determined by the relative sizes of the markets over
market competition in the two countries. A larger market is more attractive if the
number of ￿rms is equal in both countries, but if there is a su¢ ciently high number
of ￿rms in the large market, pro￿ts might be higher for ￿rms in the smaller market.
Note, however, that the owners are not mobile, and pro￿ts will be repatriated and
used in consumption in the home country.
An individual ￿rm￿ s incentive to move takes into consideration that each ￿rm
is assumed to be in￿nitesimal, and will not individually a⁄ect the price index in
any of the countries. However, in aggregate, the moving ￿rms will a⁄ect market
conditions, and this feedback must be incorporated into the equilibrium condition.
Let ￿n ￿ m ￿ n￿ be the measure of ￿rms relocating from the south to the north.
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In equilibrium, as long as there is not full specialization, i.e. both countries still
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This can be rearranged to express the measure of ￿rms moving from the south to
the north:
m =
(￿n + n￿)Y ￿ (n + ￿n￿)Y ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(Y + Y ￿)
: (9)
Equations (5￿ ), (6￿ ), and (7)-(9) complete a set of ￿ve equations that determines
capital and trade ￿ ows in equilibrium as functions of n and n￿. First, simply
from the condition that in equilibrium ￿ = ￿￿, it can be shown that the north
will always have more than a proportional share of manufacturing ￿rms, due to
the better functioning credit markets; n
n￿ > Y
Y ￿. To see this, note that with ￿rms￿
pro￿ts being equal for northern- and southern-owned ￿rms in equilibrium, dividing










+ n￿ (￿ ￿ 1 ￿ I)
:
If this is to be larger than the relative number of ￿rms, it must be that n￿ > n,
which will never be the case as long as initial wealth is identical in the two countries,
and the north has better functioning credit markets.












Note that this expression is independent of trade costs, ￿. Since country income
was only potentially a⁄ected by trade costs through ￿rms￿pro￿ts, income is also
independent of ￿. These facts greatly simplify the discussion on how trade inte-
34gration a⁄ects capital ￿ ows, as m is only a⁄ected by ￿ directly. The change in the





(Y ￿ Y ￿)(n + n￿)
(Y + Y ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2;
which is clearly positive. It is also easily shown that this e⁄ect is convex in ￿. In
other words, as the countries get more integrated, more ￿rms will be located in
the north, and this e⁄ect is accelerating as trade costs fall.
There are, however, other interesting features of the function for moving ￿rms.
If trade barriers approach in￿nity, the number of ￿rms moving north can be ex-
pressed as n￿Y ￿nY ￿
Y +Y ￿ . Using the fact that n
n￿ > Y
Y ￿ it is easy to see that this will
always be negative, meaning that there will be a ￿ ow of ￿rms moving from the
north to the south. This result comes from the fact that as trade in manufac-
tured goods goes towards zero, ￿rms in the south are completely protected from
competition from northern ￿rms. Since the north initially has a more than pro-
portional share of manufacturing ￿rms, pro￿ts will be larger for southern ￿rms in
this protected state of the world, thus attracting northern ￿rms to move produc-
tion south. In this case the model replicates the predictions from the neoclassical
models, where capital will ￿ ow from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. It also
illustrates an example of capital movements as a substitute for trade, as famously
argued by Mundell (1957). However, in my model trade ￿ ows and capital ￿ ows
may be both complements and substitutes, and capital may ￿ ow both to and from
the capital-poor south, all depending on the level of trade costs. To see this, con-
sider a reduction in trade costs. This has two e⁄ects on ￿rms￿pro￿ts: on one hand
it lowers the ￿nal price that ￿rms charge in their foreign market, and thus makes
them more competitive in this market. This increases the exports￿contribution
to total pro￿ts. On the other hand, foreign ￿rms become more competitive in the
local market, thus stealing from the ￿rms￿home market. Since there are always
more ￿rms in the north than in the south, it can be shown that for ￿rms in the
south the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst. Solving the system of equations it is
easy to show that @m
@￿ ￿ 0, which implies that a reduction in trade costs always
makes locating in the northern market relatively more attractive. For subsequent
reductions in trade costs this net e⁄ect will be even stronger since some ￿rms have
35now moved from the south to the north, and the competition e⁄ect for ￿rms in
the south will now be even more dominant than for the initial reduction in trade
costs. This explains why trade integration does not only increase m, but does so
exponentially; @2m
@￿2 ￿ 0. Further, it is also the case that at the limit, when ￿ ! 1,
the right hand side of (9) goes to in￿nity, meaning that there exists a level of trade
costs such that the movement of ￿rms switches, and that for freer trade than this
level, southern ￿rms will start locating in the north. With the measure of moving
￿rms being bounded by ￿n ￿ m ￿ n￿ this also implies that for su¢ ciently free
trade all manufacturing ￿rms will want to locate in the north, and the south will
be completely deindustrialized.
These results imply that there must be some value of trade integration where
factor ￿ ows reverse. This point is de￿ned as the value of ￿ = ￿
CR that yields
m = 0, which can be shown to be
￿
CR =
nY ￿ ￿ n￿Y
nY ￿ n￿Y ￿:
Following the arguments above it must be the case that 0 < ￿
CR < 1.
There will be some value of ￿ that will lead to full agglomeration of manufac-
turing ￿rms in the north. This occurs when the expression for m reaches its upper







This is exactly the same result as in the standard ￿ Footloose Capital￿model, i.e.
￿
CP = Y ￿
Y = 1￿s
s , where s denotes the north￿ s share of the joint (world) economy
(see Baldwin et al., 2003). This means that 0 < ￿
CR < ￿
CP < 1. In other
words the above discussion shows that when trade is su¢ ciently costly, but real
capital ￿ ows freely, ￿rms will move from the north to the south, but that trade
integration will always lead more ￿rms to locate in the north, and for su¢ ciently
free trade there will be FDI ￿ ows from southern owners in the north, while for
further reductions in trade costs there will be a level of integration such that all
existing ￿rms will be located in the north. The measure of ￿rms moving from the
36south to the north, m, can be depicted as a function of ￿ as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Measure of ￿rms moving north
The model permits analytical predictions for the welfare e⁄ects of trade liber-








￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)m]
￿
￿￿1
which is higher than in autarky if
￿n
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)m > 0:
This will be the case when ￿(n + n￿)Y +n￿Y ￿nY ￿ > 0, which is clearly not the
case for su¢ ciently low levels of trade integration, since n
n￿ > Y
Y ￿. It is increasing
in ￿, however, and will hold for
37￿ >
nY ￿ ￿ n￿Y
(n + n￿)Y
:
It can be shown that nY ￿￿n￿Y
(n+n￿)Y < ￿
CR, which means that real wages in the north
will be higher with globalization than in autarky even under some level of trade
costs that will actually lead to a deindustrialization of the north. Further, the real
wage in the north is always increasing in ￿, so further trade integration will always
increase the welfare of workers in the north. These results are similar to the ones
in Brander and Krugman (1983) previously mentioned.
It is quite intuitive that the real wage in the north is lower in the international
equilibrium than in autarky when trade is costly, and that it is increasing in the
degree of freedom of trade. Since nominal wages and the price of the traditional
good are constant, all changes follow directly from changes in the aggregate prices
for the manufactured varieties. In the international equilibrium when trade costs
are prohibitively high, I have shown that ￿rms will move to the south. Since
with trade costs at this level there will be no trade, the only di⁄erence between
the international and the autarky equilibria is that there will be fewer ￿rms in
the north in the international equilibrium, the aggregate price of manufactured
varieties will be higher, and the real wage will be lower. A trade liberalization,
however, has two e⁄ects that decrease the aggregate price, and hence increase
the real wage. First, as shown above, freer trade means that more ￿rms will
locate in the north, meaning that their products will be sold without trade costs,
and secondly, the varieties that are still produced in the south and thus include
transport costs in the ￿nal price will have lower trade costs. There will thus be
a level of trade costs, where for trade costs lower than this the real wage in the
north will always be higher in the international equilibrium than in autarky.
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which is higher than in autarky if
￿n ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m > 0
38This is always the case, and contrary to the case for northern wages, wages in the
south are always higher in the static international equilibrium than in autarky. The
left hand side of this inequality is increasing in ￿. Since m < 0 for ￿ = 0 the above
condition must hold for all non-negative values of ￿, implying that real wages
are always higher under international trade than in autarky in the south. The
intuition here is not as clear as for the northern country. It is straightforward that
the international equilibrium with prohibitively high trade costs means increased
real wages in the south, as ￿rms will move from the north to the south in this
case. The two e⁄ects from a lowering of trade costs now have opposite e⁄ects,
however: imported varieties from the north become cheaper, but more ￿rms will
locate in the north, and will thus include trade costs in their ￿nal price in the
south. The ￿rst e⁄ect will, however, always dominate, and the real wage is higher
in the international equilibrium than in autarky, and this di⁄erence increases as
trade gets freer.






, a move from autarky to the international equi-
librium means that real wages will fall in the north, while they will increase in the
south. When trade is freer than this, however, real wages will increase in both
countries under internationalization.
3 Static model when trade costs are asymmetric
The above results; that a trade liberalization may lead to deindustrialization in the
south is somewhat di⁄erent from what Antr￿s and Caballero (2009) argue in their
Heckscher-Ohlin based model with ￿nance market imperfections. One reason for
this is that in a Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade there is no intra-industry trade,
so any reduction in trade costs in one sector will work as increased market access
for one of the countries. In this subsection I will show that my model will generate
similar predictions to those of Antr￿s and Caballero when I consider a unilateral
trade liberalization instead of a symmetrical reduction in trade costs.
Let us now assume that market access to the foreign market is not necessarily
identical for ￿rms producing in the north and in the south. This can be thought
of as some import tax (that is wasted), or import costs associated with custom
39clearance, paperwork, etc., t, such that ￿ = (￿ + t)
1￿￿, and where it may be the
case that t 6= t￿. Let ￿ denote the degree of access to the southern market for the
northern ￿rms, while ￿
￿ indicates southern ￿rms￿access to the northern market.
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Solving this with respect to m yields the following expression:
m =
Y (1 ￿ ￿
￿)(￿n + n￿) ￿ Y ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(n + ￿
￿n￿)
(1 ￿ ￿
￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(Y + Y ￿)
:
The national incomes are determined as above, which implies that a drop in trade
costs for manufactured varieties produced in the south and sold in the north will




(n + n￿)Y ￿
(1 ￿ ￿
￿)
2 (Y + Y ￿)
< 0;
which tells a similar story to that of Antr￿s and Caballero (2009) where ￿rms
move to the south and export their goods back to the north. The intuition behind
this is straightforward; the unilateral trade liberalization increases competition
in the north, thus reducing the pro￿ts of ￿rms producing in the north. At the
same time it makes ￿rms producing in the south more competitive in the northern
market, thus increasing pro￿ts for ￿rms producing in the south. Competition in
the southern market is una⁄ected. This yields an increase in pro￿ts for ￿rms in
40the south, and a drop in pro￿ts for ￿rms producing in the north, which will be
compensated by ￿rms moving from the north to the south, until equilibrium is
restored.
This illustrates how di⁄erent the e⁄ects of these di⁄erent trade liberalizations
are for the involved parts, and thus shows that one should be careful when dis-
cussing the e⁄ects of globalization on both capital movements and welfare levels.
In the rest of the paper I will however, stick to the symmetrical reduction in trade
costs.
4 Model with inter-generational savings
Up until now, I have looked at static version of the model. There are, however,
some interesting e⁄ects when I introduce generations and savings through bequests
into the model. In this section I will incorporate this, ￿rst into the autarky version
of the model, and later into the model with ￿rm mobility and international trade.









￿; 0 < ￿;￿;￿ < 1; ￿ + ￿ + ￿ = 1; (1￿ )
where CM and CA are as before, and B represents bequests left to the next gen-
eration. This is a reduced-form altruism, where bequests leave the giver with a
"warm, fuzzy feeling". The great advantage of this, is that individuals will leave
a constant share ￿ of their expendable income as bequests for their o⁄spring. A
more realistic way of modelling altruism would be to let the o⁄spring￿ s utility en-
ter directly into the utility-function of the giver. Such a utility function would
lead to nonlinearities in the share of total income individuals will leave to their
o⁄spring for individuals who would be marginally too poor to leave their o⁄spring
unconstrained in my formulation. This complicates calculations severely, but does
not change the conclusions of the model qualitatively, and I therefore prefer the
simpli￿ed version for modeling altruism. For a more thorough discussion of the
issues related to this simpli￿cation, see Chesnokova (2007). The wealth dynamics
41for "family" i are as follows,
Wi;t+1 =
￿
￿ (Wi;t + 1); if Wi;t < ￿ W
￿ (Wi;t + ￿t ￿ I); if Wi;t ￿ ￿ W
:
I call the W￿ s initial wealth, as this is the wealth an individual has at the start
of his life, which is the wealth that determines whether he is credit-constrained or
not. This should not be confused with the individual￿ s budget constraint, which
will be the sum of this initial wealth, and earnings. This start-of-period initial
wealth will through the above dynamics converge towards Wu =
￿
1￿￿ (￿ ￿ I) for
unconstrained agents, and Wc =
￿
1￿￿ for constrained agents. This can be depicted
in Figure 2. The slope of the inter-generational wealth dynamics are equal for
constrained and unconstrained agents, but the graph for the unconstrained agents
will always lie above the one for the credit-constrained agents. Since ￿ < 1 these
slopes are ￿ atter than the 45￿ line where Wt+1 = Wt, which ensures that they will
cross this line once from above.
Figure 2: Inter-generational wealth dynamics
Credit-constrained agents with initial wealth below Wc will leave their o⁄spring
with more initial wealth than they had themselves. Conversely, credit-constrained
agents with initial wealth above Wc will leave less in bequests than they started
out with. This implies two important things: the share of the population that
is credit-constrained does not diminish, and initial wealth for credit-constrained
42agents will converge towards Wc =
￿
1￿￿.
The story for the unconstrained agents is somewhat di⁄erent. While it is
the case that agents with Wi > Wu will leave less in bequests than they started
with, and agents with ￿ W < Wi < Wu will leave more than they started with, the
unconstrained share of the population may diminish if pro￿ts are too low. Figure 2
depicts the wealth dynamics for two situations: when pro￿ts are ￿ > ￿ ￿, and when
they are ￿0 < ￿ ￿. Note that for the credit-constrained agents, wealth dynamics
are unchanged in the two cases. In the diagram to the left pro￿ts are ￿ and all
unconstrained agents are able to leave their o⁄spring unconstrained as well. To see
this, note that the poorest unconstrained agent with wealth Wi = ￿ W will still be
able to leave the next generation with su¢ cient funds to be unconstrained (point
A). Since his initial wealth is below Wu he will also be able to leave his o⁄spring
with more initial wealth than he started out with himself. In this case the number
of unconstrained agents, and thus also the number of ￿rms, stays the same, pro￿ts
are unchanged, and initial wealth among unconstrained agents converges towards
Wu =
￿
1￿￿ (￿ ￿ I). If, initially, pro￿ts are ￿0 the story is di⁄erent. In this case
all unconstrained agents have initial wealth above W 0
u and will thus leave their
o⁄spring with less initial wealth than they had. This means that the poorest
unconstrained agent, with Wi = ￿ W, (point B) will not be able to leave the next
generation unconstrained. This means that in t+1 there will be fewer ￿rms, which
we from (3) clearly see will increase pro￿ts. This again shifts the wealth dynamic
function upwards, meaning that the long-run equilibrium will not converge to W 0
u.
This process will rather repeat itself until pro￿ts have been pushed up to ￿ ￿. At
this point the poorest unconstrained agent will earn exactly enough to leave the
next generation unconstrained, and the initial wealth of the unconstrained agents
will converge towards
￿
1￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ I) = ￿ W. Since we know from before that ￿ W = I
￿
this pro￿t level is determined by
￿ ￿ =
1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿￿
I:
It is easy to see that the minimum operating pro￿ts that can sustain the population
of ￿rms is decreasing in the sophistication of the contractual environment, ￿. This
is intuitive, as when credit constraints are less binding, less wealthy potential
43entrepreneurs can get access to ￿nancing to start up their businesses, and thus need
to leave less bequests to their o⁄spring for them to be ￿nancially unconstrained as
well. The dynamics explained in Figure 2 determine the size of the unconstrained
share of the population, and also the equilibrium wealth levels of both constrained
and unconstrained agents. Over time all agents will converge to these wealth levels,
and total expendable income in the country will converge towards
Y =
1 + n[￿ ￿ (1 + I)]
1 ￿ ￿
:
If the initial number of ￿rms can be sustained in the long-term equilibrium, in-
serting this income level into (3) will determine the operating pro￿ts as a function
of the number of ￿rms, where this number is again determined by the share of
the population that is initially unconstrained, just as in the static version of the
model. Equilibrium pro￿ts can thus generally be expressed
￿ = max
￿











If pro￿ts initially are too low to sustain the number of ￿rms, the unconstrained
share of the population will shrink according to the mechanisms illustrated in
Figure 2 until:
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￿￿￿ (I + 1) + [￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿][1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿]I
￿
:
Both of these expressions are increasing in the quality of the contractual climate,
￿, meaning that the number of entrepreneurs will always be larger in the northern
country when the countries are identical in all other aspects than in contract
enforceability. The number of ￿rms in the dynamic model is also equal to or lower
than than in the static model. Since there is no leapfrogging in the income ranking,
it is possible to de￿ne a wealth level ~ W ￿ ￿ W that is the minimum wealth level in
44period t = 0 that will leave the agent￿ s successors unconstrained in the long-run
equilibrium. This wealth level is implicitly de￿ned by
Z ~ W
￿ W






If initial pro￿ts are su¢ ciently high to sustain the number of ￿rms, the dynamic
model does not generate any interesting changes from the static version, so in the
rest of the paper I will consider the situations where this is not the case, and the
equilibrium number of ￿rms is determined endogenously by credit constraints and
pro￿ts.
4.1 Globalization in the dynamic model
Since the equilibrium number of ￿rms in the dynamic model is determined endoge-
nously and, as I will show, is now a⁄ected by the international competition, I will
in the following denote the number of ￿rms in autarky and in the international
equilibrium by nA and nI, respectively. If equilibrium pro￿ts are too low to sustain
the initial number of ￿rms, pro￿ts in autarky will converge towards
￿ ￿ =









This expression is clearly decreasing in ￿, and since ￿ > ￿
￿, this implies that
￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿, meaning that pro￿ts must be higher for unconstrained agents in the south
to be able to leave their o⁄spring unconstrained as well. This can be seen as an
analogy to a situation where projects in the south must present a higher expected
pro￿tability in order to attract ￿nancing, which is re￿ ected in the insurance costs
of projects in developing countries compared to similar projects in the developed
world.3
In the international equilibrium with ￿rm mobility and international trade,
pro￿ts will be the same for both northern and southern ￿rms. There are three
3See for example price di⁄erences for investment guarantees at MIGA (http://www.miga.org/)
and similar organisations.
45possible scenarios when comparing short-term pro￿ts with the sustainable pro￿t
levels:
1. ￿ ￿￿ > ￿ ￿ > ￿I
2. ￿ ￿￿ > ￿I ￿ ￿ ￿
3. ￿I ￿ ￿ ￿￿ > ￿ ￿
Of these, only case 3 is a stable equilibrium when taking into account the inter-
generational wealth dynamics. In case 1 pro￿ts are too low in both countries to
maintain the current number of ￿rms. This means that over time fewer entrepre-
neurs will leave their o⁄spring with su¢ cient bequests to start a business, total
number of ￿rms will fall, and pro￿ts of the remaining ￿rms will increase, until
￿I = ￿ ￿. At this point the situation will be as described in case 2. At this point,
the poorest entrepreneur in the north will be able to leave his o⁄spring enough
bequests for him to be unconstrained as well, and from this point in time the num-
ber of ￿rms in the north will be stable. However, pro￿ts are still not high enough
to sustain the unconstrained share of the population in the south. The number
of southern ￿rms will thus keep falling until ￿I = ￿ ￿￿. In this stable equilibrium
operating pro￿ts will be ￿I =
1+(￿￿￿1)￿
￿￿￿ I. This long-run equilibrium condition from
the credit constraints can be used to determine the equilibrium number of ￿rms
as in the autarky example. This level of operating pro￿ts means that expendable
income in each country will converge towards
Y =












￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
: (13)
The measure of ￿rms moving north can now be determined by
m =
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Firms will still move until ￿ = ￿￿, so inserting (12), (13), and (14) into (5￿ )
46equilibrium pro￿ts can be expressed as a function of the total number of ￿rms
￿ =







￿ (nI + n￿I)￿
: (15)
This pro￿t expression is thus determined by total demand and the number of
competing ￿rms. Since I am only focusing on the situation where initial pro￿ts
are too low to sustain the initial number of ￿rms, the long-run equilibrium number







￿ (1 + I) + [￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿][1 + (￿
￿ ￿ 1)￿]I
:
It is easy to see that as long as both goods are produced in both countries, the
total number of ￿rms in the world economy only depends on the quality of the
￿nancial system in the south, ￿
￿. This happens because the north will always reach
a state where the unconstrained share of the population is stable before the south
does. After this point, the number of southern-owned ￿rms will keep falling. A less
developed ￿nancial system in the south means that the total number of ￿rms in the
long run will be lower. However, it also means that the number of northern-owned
￿rms will be higher. This follows naturally from the fact that as the number of
southern ￿rms fall, pro￿ts for the remaining ￿rms, both northern and southern,
rise, thus making a lower share of the northern population capital constrained
in the long run. Stricter credit constraints in the south will mean that more
southern-owned ￿rms go out of business each period. This again increases pro￿ts
faster, so they will reach the critical level to sustain the number of northern-owned
￿rms, ￿ ￿, faster, thus leaving the north with a larger share of the manufacturing
industry. The ￿nancial system in the north does not a⁄ect the total number of
￿rms in equilibrium, but a high ￿ implies that ￿ ￿ will be lower, and thus will be
reached faster, implying that a better functioning ￿nancial system in the north
leads to a crowding out e⁄ect in the south, and will increase the north￿ s share of
world manufacturing industry. In the long-run equilibrium, it is thus the ￿nancial
system in the south that determines the total number of ￿rms in the world, but it
is the relative strengths of the ￿nancial systems that determine the relative number
of entrepreneurs in the two countries.






￿ (I + 1) + [￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿][1 + (￿
￿ ￿ 1)￿]I
;
which is exactly one half of the total number of ￿rms in equilibrium with in-
ternational trade, thus 2n￿A = nI + n￿I. Further, with pro￿ts being equal for all
￿rms, there can be no leapfrogging in wealth among unconstrained agents in either
country, and there will always be more northern-owned ￿rms than southern-owned
￿rms. This again implies that the number of southern ￿rms is always lower in the
international equilibrium than in autarky, n￿A ￿ n￿I. The reason for this is that
with stricter credit constraints and fewer ￿rms in the south, the ￿rms located here
will be more protected than their northern counterparts in autarky, which leads
to higher pro￿ts in equilibrium. With international competition these pro￿ts are
pushed down, and some ￿rms must leave the market in order to raise pro￿ts to
sustainable levels again. Since equilibrium pro￿ts for northern ￿rms are higher in
the international equilibrium than in autarky, the number of northern-owned ￿rms
may actually be higher in the globalized world than in autarky if the drop in the
number of southern ￿rms happens su¢ ciently fast; however, this depends on the
distribution of initial wealth, and the rates at which the world converges to the
long-run equilibrium.
Comparing the above results to the results from the static model we can imme-
diately point out some important di⁄erences. With mobile ￿rms, all ￿rms earn the
same pro￿ts. Since pro￿ts for southern ￿rms are equal in autarky and in the inter-
national equilibrium, and further are higher than regular wages, this means that
fewer ￿rms means lower total income in the country. An e⁄ect from international
trade and capital mobility for the southern country as a whole that is ignored in
the static model is thus that when credit constraints are binding, there will be a
crowding out e⁄ect with international trade. Competition from northern ￿rms will
drive some of the southern ￿rms out of the market, and the deindustrialization will
reduce the total country income. However, as I showed above, welfare levels may
indeed increase from internationalization in spite of falling national income, as
international trade means increased variety of manufactured goods and a drop in
the price index. However, compared to the static model the dynamic equilibrium
48predicts a worse outcome for the south for this e⁄ect for all levels of trade costs,
as income and the total number of ￿rms will be lower.4 Full agglomeration occurs





￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)I ￿ ￿￿
￿]n￿I
￿￿
￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)I ￿ ￿￿
￿]nI :
Similarly to in the static model, this is equal to Y ￿
Y , and since nI > n￿I it is also
the case that 0 < ￿
CP < 1.
The model with intergenerational savings thus reproduces the main predictions
about trade and capital ￿ ows from the static model. However, I have also shown
that when the number of ￿rms is determined by the long-term credit constraints,
the competition e⁄ect from international trade reduces the number of southern
￿rms compared to the autarky outcome. This reduction in the number of southern-
owned ￿rms will for some levels of trade costs reduce the number of ￿rms moving
north, but this reduction is never enough to compensate for the direct reduction
in the number of ￿rms producing in the south, and it can be shown that
@(n￿￿m)
@n￿ >
08￿. This means that for any level of trade costs the number of ￿rms producing
in the south will be lower, compared to the static model. This means that both
the real wage and social utility in the south are lower in the dynamic model than
in the static model. Looking speci￿cally at the real wage in the south, it can




















Since wages are normalized to 1, the only e⁄ect on real wages in the model is
through changes in the price index, and real wages in the international equilibrium




￿I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m > n
￿A: (16)
4This follows from my choice to only focus on the situation where credit constraints are so
severe that the initial number of ￿rms is not sustainable. However, as there will never be more
￿rms in the dynamic equilibrium compared to the static equilibrium, welfare levels will never be
higher in the dynamic model.
49In stark contrast to the static equilibrium, this is no longer always the case. In-
serting for m it is quite straightforward to show that the left-hand side of the
above expression is monotonically increasing in ￿. Further, inserting ￿ = 0 and
rearranging yields that !￿I > !￿A if and only if:










which only holds for n￿I > n￿A, something I have already shown will never be the
case. The real wage is thus lower in the international equilibrium when trade costs






Since I have already shown that nI + n￿I = 2n￿A, the above condition must hold,
and the real wage is higher in the international equilibrium when there is perfect
trade integration between the countries. Since (16) in monotonically increasing in
￿ there must also exist a level of trade costs such that the real wage in the south
is higher in the international equilibrium for all values of ￿ above this. For the
unconstrained agents in the south, the e⁄ects are even more severe. All families
that started out as unconstrained will experience a drop in income. Some, due to
the fact that the long-run equilibrium pro￿ts in the international equilibrium will
be lower than in autarky, and some because they will become credit-constrained,
and start earning normal wages. For su¢ ciently free trade this drop in income
may be compensated for by an increased variety of goods, and a lower price index,
but the required trade integration for this is even higher than the one that makes
!￿I > !￿A. This implies that for high levels of trade costs, overall welfare in the
south will be lower in the international equilibrium than in autarky.
Although both the static and the dynamic versions of the model predict that
real wages will be maximized under completely free trade, there are some con-
siderable and important di⁄erences. The most important of these is that in the
dynamic version of the model, the international competition will push down pro￿ts
for southern-owned ￿rms, thus strengthening credit constraints, and reducing the
unconstrained share of the population and the number of ￿rms. In this version
of the model globalization leads to a deindustrialization of the least developed
50country, and if trade is su¢ ciently costly, to a drop both in real wages and also in
overall welfare levels.
This shows that when taking into consideration the e⁄ects of ￿nance market
imperfections, internationalization may lead to deindustrialization and a drop in
real wages in the less developed country. One must however be cautious in inter-
preting this as a defense for import substitution and protectionism. In my analysis
I have looked at globalization as the mobility of both goods and ￿rms. The poten-
tial losses from globalization in my model come mainly from deindustrialization
in the south due to competition from northern ￿rms, but also from southern ￿rms
moving closer to the larger market in the north. If the government in the southern
country has limited possibilities in preventing inhabitants from investing abroad,
or its ￿rms from moving abroad, limiting trade will thus only increase welfare
losses.
5 Conclusion
Foreign direct investment and trade ￿ ows are both important aspects of the process
of globalization. In this paper I have shown how the two mutually a⁄ect each other,
and thus in sum determine real wages and social welfare in a globalizing world.
This interdependence shows the danger in discussing globalization in light of only
trade ￿ ows, or only capital ￿ ow. Symmetrical reductions in trade costs will cause
￿rms to move towards the larger market.
In addition, I have also shown how imperfections in the ￿nancial markets may
generate the heterogeneity between countries that may lead to an industrialized
centre and a deindustrialized periphery. In the long-run equilibrium such imper-
fections may also cause international competition to squeeze southern ￿rms out
of the market, and thus increase the di⁄erence in economic size between the de-
veloped north and the developing south. If trade is su¢ ciently costly, but capital
mobile, this may lead to a drop in utility for both ￿rm owners and workers in the
south. This result stands in contrast to the simple static model where the initial
number of ￿rms is constant. In this case real wages in the south are always higher
in the international equilibrium than in autarky. This highlights the di¢ culties
of predicting welfare e⁄ects of proposed trade reforms. The di⁄erent predictions
51from the simple static model and the more complex model with inter-generational
savings are general to any initial wealth distribution, and to all permitted para-
meter values. National welfare for the two countries is purposely left out of the
discussion in this paper, as this discussion would require certain such assumptions.
Generally, one can say that social welfare would be lower in the international equi-
librium with high trade costs than in autarky in the north in both versions of the
model, and in the south in the long-term version of the model. However, whether
this would also be the case in the short-term model, and whether social welfare
would turn positive for su¢ ciently free trade, would depend on the shape of G(W)
and the relative sizes of ￿ and ￿.
From a development point of view, the important conclusions are that interna-
tional competition may crowd out southern ￿rms, and lead to a deindustrialization
that could possibly hurt both social welfare and real wage levels in the country
with the least developed ￿nancial system.
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When the level of trade costs are such that there is full agglomeration, m = n￿I,
and it follows naturally that
@(n￿I￿m)
@n￿I = 0. When both countries have a manufac-
turing sector, the di⁄erential will always be positive. For notational simplicity, let
D := [(1 ￿ ￿)I ￿ ￿￿
￿] > 0. The di⁄erential can then be written
@ (n￿ ￿ m)
@n￿ =
2￿￿







nI + n￿I￿2 D2
(1 ￿ ￿)[D(nI + n￿I) + 2￿￿
￿]
2 :
With D > 0 and 1 > ￿ all the elements of both the numerator and the denominator
of this fraction are strictly positive, thus making the whole expression strictly
positive, and for
@(n￿I￿m)
@n￿I ￿ 0 to hold, it is thus su¢ cient to show that D > 0. I
show this using the fact that @D
@I > 0, and that credit constraints are assumed to
be binding, which means that I >
￿
1￿￿￿
￿. The minimum value I can take is thus
￿￿￿
1￿￿ + ", with " marginally larger than zero. Inserting this minimum value of I









￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)" > 0
QED.
Appendix A2: Potential welfare gain in the south
from internationalization
I want to prove the following statement:
V
￿I ￿ V
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To prove that this may be the case, it is su¢ cient to insert a set of permitted
parameter values such that V ￿I ￿ V ￿A > 0. This can be done by inserting a set








This implies that n￿A = 0:179. I have shown that nI + n￿I = 2n￿A which means
that we have nI + n￿I = 0:358. Exactly what the number of ￿rms will be in each
country in the international equilibrium will depend on ￿ and the initial income
distributions in the countries. Without assuming any speci￿c values and shapes
for these, I merely de￿ne some values:
n
I





2 = 0:33 and n
￿I
2 = 0:028
to illustrate one case with relatively similar ￿nancial markets in the two countries,
and one where they are very di⁄erent. These values imply that ￿
CP
1 = 0:958 and
￿
CP
2 = 0:73274. The two cases are shown below through the graphical expressions
of the welfare gain from going from autarky to the international equilibrium V ￿I
j ￿
V ￿A





As the graphs show, in both cases social welfare in the south will be lower in
the international case when trade costs are high (￿ is low), but that it will be
higher for su¢ ciently high trade integration. The discontinuities show the levels
at which there will be complete agglomeration, and all ￿rms will be located in the
north. From this point and onwards the di⁄erence in welfare in the international
equilibrium and in autarky increases more rapidly with the lowering of trade costs,
as this now only makes imported goods cheaper, without causing more ￿rms to
move (as there are no ￿rms left in the south). The higher (black) line shows the
case of relatively similar countries, while the lower (red) line depicts the situation
where credit constraints are much more severe in the south than in the north.
These clearly show that the international equilibrium yields higher social welfare
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